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ABSTRACT 
In this discussion paper we develop a theory-based typology of innovation networks with a 
special focus on public-private collaboration. This taxonomy is theoretically based on the 
concept of life cycles which is transferred to the context of innovation networks as well as on 
the mode of network formation which can occur either spontaneous or planned. The taxon-
omy distinguishes six different types of networks and incorporates two plausible alternative 
developments that eventually lead to a similar network structure of the two types of networks. 
From this, important conclusions and recommendations for network actors and policy makers 
are drawn. 
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Introduction 
The investigation of innovation networks in different settings as well as the assessment of 
their performance as a result of their respective characteristics requires the employment of a 
suitable taxonomy. However, developing such a taxonomy is not an easy task. Innovation 
networks are not static but permanently evolving in their most characteristic features such as 
their composition and structure and sometimes even with regards to their research directions 
and goals. Additionally, these processes are highly interrelated and co-evolutionary and, thus, 
hard to be distinguished and analyzed individually. These changes are mostly small and in-
cremental and endogenous to the network. They are taking place permanently but not con-
tinuously during the network evolution. This complicates the identification, distinction and 
comparison of innovation networks since the observed differences might simply be due to 
different stages in the life-cycle of the respective innovation networks. Thus, any useful ty-
pology of innovation networks has to take into account these co-evolving dynamics. 
A theoretically and empirically well-founded concept that incorporates these dynamic aspects 
and at the same time allows for a clear cut distinction of the different stages is the life cycle 
concept. The life cycle concept was successfully applied and tested in the context of manufac-
turing industries and their underlying products and technologies (Abernathy and Utterback, 
1978; Jovanovic, 1994; Klepper, 1996; 1997). The basic idea of the concept is to divide the 
evolution of industries into sequential and distinguishable stages. Such stages also shape the 
evolution of innovation networks, which makes the concept of life cycles a valuable tool in 
investigating the evolution of innovation networks. 
While the life cycle concept enables us to distinguish innovation networks along their devel-
opment path, we also need a characteristic feature to explain the observable differences be-
tween innovation networks that are at the same stage of their life cycle. This is done by intro-
ducing the mode of network formation as the second dimension to our taxonomy. Here, em-
pirical evidence suggests that there are basically two modes in which a social network is 
formed – it either emerges spontaneously or is created in a planned manner. Since the mode 
of network formation has an enduring impact on the fundamental network characteristics and 
their evolution the incorporation of this dimension allows us to distinguish and compare 
therein distinct networks even when they are at the same stage of their respective life cycle.  
Finally, the observable differences between the diferent types of innovation networks have to 
be identified quantitatively in order to make them empirically comparable. Since innovation 
networks are composed of actors and the relations and interactions between them, the social 
dimension is of uttermost importance in this context. Thus, we need a methodology that al-
lows us to incorporate the social aspects of interaction and cooperation as well as the peculi-
arities of the respective network composition and structure. A methodology that incorporates 
all these features is the Social Network Analysis (SNA). Combining the concepts of life cy-
cles and modes of network formation and applying methods and indicators from social net-
work analysis to identify and distinguish different network types will provide us with a com-
prehensive typology of innovation networks that meets the requirements of investigating pub-
lic private innovation networks in services. 
The Life Cyle Concept in the Context of Innovation Networks 
The discovery of the industry life cycle (ILC) has been one of the most important develop-
ments in industrial dynamics of the last thirty years. Many sectors have been found to follow 
a similar development path, going through the same series of stages which can be described as 
a life cycle (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Jovanovic, 1994; Klepper, 1996; 1997). Given 
that an ILC is followed by many but not by all the sectors, a very important question arises 
concerning the determinants of and the conditions under which an ILC can be observed. The 
literature has provided a number of answers to this question. In the following we review the 
literature on the nature and dynamics of the ILC before transferring it into the context of in-
novation networks. 
The concept of ILCs has had a number of precursors. Relevant examples of these concepts are 
dominant designs (Abernathy, Utterback, 1975), technological regimes (Nelson, Winter, 
1977), technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982), technological guideposts (Sahal, 1985) and the 
concept of the product life cycle (Vernon, 1966, Gort and Klepper, 1982). As it turns out all 
the sectors for which a life cycle was observed are implicitly defined by products and produc-
tion technologies. However, it was not until the 1990s that the term ‘industry life cycle’ was 
regularly used. The scholars who contributed to the study of ILCs did not simply change the 
term but considerably improved our understanding of the underlying dynamics.  
The ILC is usually characterized by the existence of seven regularities or principles of evolu-
tion (see Klepper 1996 and Saviotti et al. (2007): 
• Entry is dominant in the early phases of the life cycle while exits progressively domi-
nate in the course of the cycle 
• First movers generally have a leadership position which guarantees their long-term 
viability and, thus, firm size increases in the course of the cycle 
• Market shares are highly volatile in the beginning but tend to stabilize over time 
• Production increases in the initial stages and declines in the final stages 
• Product innovation tends to be replaced by process innovation 
• Product variety disappears over time and a dominant design emerges 
• A massive process of exit (shakeout) occurs in the later stages of the life cycle 
These characteristics lead to the well known sequence of stages in life cycle concepts. While 
there is some variance in the number of distinct stages in the different life cycle concepts 
there are four broader stages that are generally distinguished: The initial stage (also fragmen-
tation or emergence), the growth stage, the maturity stage (also shake-out), and finally the 
decline stage. This leads to the ILC development path as illustrated in figure 1. 
Figure 1: The four general stages of the life cycle concept. 
 
 
In the remaining of this section we apply the ILC concept to the evolution of public private 
innovation networks. This proceeding is based on the assumption that networks, just as indus-
tries and technologies, undergo several distinguishable phases which are shaped by processes 
similar to those of industries. 
In the ILC concept the initial emergence stage is characterized by the entrance of the first 
entrepreneurial firm(s) setting up a business to commercialize their invention (Ayres et al., 
2003). By this they actually transform the invention into an innovation. The entrepreneur is 
quickly followed by some early followers (imitators) seeking a head start to realize early 
mover advantages. The number and rate of new entrants at this stage is still quite low. Also, 
the firms in the industry are still rather small as is the output produced by each of them. Since 
the underlying technology is in its infancy it has not yet created a large demand. Furthermore, 
the associated knowledge base can be expected to be geographically and institutionally spe-
cific (Van Beuzekom, 2001; Van Reenen, 2002). In biotechnology, for example, experts were 
located in a handful of US and UK universities (Orsenigo, 1989). For the internet it was a few 
US universities, the US military (ARPANET), and CERN (European Organisation for Nu-
clear Research). These examples also illustrate that public support and financing can be essen-
tial for the development of the basic technology at this early stage of the life cycle (McMillan 
et al., 2000). Government policies in this proto-industry stage are likely to be local in a geo-
graphical and structural sense. They may take the form of piecemeal, local regional funding 
projects and/or academic research grants (Caracostas and Muldur, 2001). Such flexible public 
support might be appropriate at this stage of the life cycle, given the high degree of risk asso-
ciated with highly specialized embryonic technologies, the high number of technology fail-
ures that occur, and the fact that the relevant technological knowledge is not yet widely dif-
fused (Coombs and Metcalfe, 2002; Walsh and Rodorfos, 2002). 
 
 
Transferring this stage of the ILC to innovation networks we are talking about the process of 
network formation. Following theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence network forma-
tion can either be triggered by an enabling actor or emerge spontaneously in a self-organised 
manner. We will discuss these formation processes and their implications for the network 
composition and structure in more detail below. 
The consecutive growth stage of the ILC is characterized by an increasing number of firm 
entries. At this stage a new industry emerges. The central activity at this stage is the marketi-
zation of the new technology. Competition is continuously intensifying as competitors start to 
realise business opportunities. The new entrants have a disproportionally large share in (in-
cremental) product innovations, providing them with the incentive to enter the market (Klep-
per, 1996). The new start-up firms are the major innovators and become key players in the 
emerging industry (e.g. Saxenian, 1994 for ICT industry in Silicon Valley). With the high 
entry rate the number of competing versions and technological standards increases. At the 
same time the firms grow bigger in size and output. However, the firm growths as well as the 
associated market share are subject to permanent change. No incumbent firm has yet estab-
lished a dominant position or enforced a technological standard. 
Applying these ideas to innovation networks we observe a rapid expansion in the number of 
members as well as in their diversity. Again, there are different scenarios or mechanisms by 
which a network can grow. One scenario resembles a snowball-pattern in which new mem-
bers are recommended by the latest newcomers, who themselves were recommended by ear-
lier network members. Another scenario is the selection and invitation of new members by 
just one or a few very central actors of the core network. This latter scenario is more likely in 
networks that were initiated by one or a few enabling actors – such as government agencies or 
departments. Again, we will discuss these scenarios in more detail below. 
The maturity stage (shake-out) is characterized by a turning point: The net number of firms 
declines because the exit rate exceeds the entry rate.1 Due to the various substitutive products 
and technologies the competition intensifies. The individual firms have to increase their mar-
ket share or are forced to exit the market. Thus, we observe a shift in the innovative focus 
from (incremental) product innovation to (cost-reducing) process innovation which allow for 
the realisation of economies of scale (Abernathy and Utterback, 1978; Utterback and Suarez, 
1993; Utterback, 1994; Klepper 1996 and 1997). This shift to cost-based competition leads to 
the observed shake-out, which decreases the density of firms in the respective industry. As a 
result, vertical and horizontal integration lead to increasing market concentration and the vari-
ance in market shares and innovativeness decreases favouring larger firms. 
                                                 
1
 The first increasing and later decreasing number of firms is the most consistent regularity found in ILC litera-
ture. Of course, the maximum number of firms as well as the lower value attained in mature phases vary 
considerably between industries. However, the qualitative pattern is robust. In industrial dynamics different 
explanations for this shake-out are offered. While Utterback and Suarez (1993) explain it with the emer-
gence of a dominant design, Jovanovich and MacDonald (1994) assume external technological shocks, 
whereas Klepper (1996) argues that the timing of entry is determining the shake-out. 
 
Despite the broad observability of the shake-out in ILCs some authors argue for a relatively 
long and stable maturity phase instead of the rather sharp turning point in the number of 
firms. In other concepts further innovations disrupt the ILC at the maturity stage leading to 
the start of a new cycle within the same industry (Tushman and Anderson, 1986). The decline 
stage is postponed for those firms that are able to adopt the new technology. This leads to a 
development in which the industry growth rate varies around a certain level (see figure 2); 
however, it might also lead to an overall growth of the entire industry with every innovation 
increasing the size of the market and the corresponding number of firms (see figure 3). 
Figure 2: Cycle-Recycle based on Tushman and Andeson (1986; 1990).2 
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
F
ir
m
s
t
N
u
m
b
e
r
o
f
F
ir
m
s
t
 
 
Figure 3:  Innovative Maturity.3 
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The maturity stage of innovation networks is characterised by intensive interaction and con-
siderable knowledge flows. At this stage learning and knowledge generation reach their peak. 
As the underlying technology becomes more application-orientation the focus shifts from ex-
ploration to exploitation and from radically new solutions to their incremental improvement. 
This is reflected in the network architectures and structures as well as in the roles played by 
the different actors. The resulting network structures range from a star-network (i.e. there is a 
                                                 
2
 See also Cox (1963) and Cunningham (1969). 
3
  See Buzzell (1966). 
central actor that decides, coordinates and controls all interactions within the network) to a 
completely connected network (i.e. democratic decision-making, self-organisation and self-
control). This has obvious consequences for the roles played by the actors in the respective 
networks (e.g. central actors, peripheral actors, equal actors etc.) as will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
The decline stage of the ILC is characterised by what Schumpeter called ‘creative destruc-
tion’. The mature industry is threatened by new technological developments that substitute its 
products and services. Because of the decreasing demand (market saturation and a shift to-
wards the new products and services) many companies are forced to leave the industry, oc-
cupy a niche or come up with further innovations. 
In the context of innovation networks this corresponds with the dissolving of the network be-
cause the networks’ purpose is accomplished (i.e. the generation, commercialisation and dif-
fusion of innovation). However, for the purpose of this paper the decline stage is not of inter-
est and, thus, will be left aside in the following. 
In order to develop a useful taxonomy of innovation networks we have to introduce a second 
dimension that allows us to explain the differences between networks that are at the same 
stage of their life cycle. As it turns out, the mode of network formation is crucial in explaining 
these differences with respect to network characteristics such as structure, composition and 
the roles played by different actors. Therefore, the next section discusses the determinants of 
the mode of network formation and its implications for the subsequent network evolution. 
The Mode of Network Formation as a Second Dimension of the Network Typology 
In this section we introduce the second dimension to our taxonomy of innovation networks: 
the mode of network formation. This dimension is important because the mode of network 
formation has major implications for the composition, structure and evolution of networks. In 
principle, two modes of network formation can be distinguished: A network can either be cre-
ated in a planned manner by an enabling actor or it can spontaneously emerge (see Powell et 
al., 1996; Koza and Lewin; 1999; for an overview see Doz et al. 2000).  
The following section is largely in line with the study by Doz, Olk, and Ring (2000) who 
summarize the existing literature and conduct a large scale study to investigate the two types 
of network formation. Their analysis shows that the actual mode of network formation de-
pends to a large extent on the existence of environmental pressure or opportunities in the form 
of economical, technological, legal or demographic changes (e.g. increasing global competi-
tion, the emergence of new substitutive technologies, environmental pressure, economic lib-
eralization etc.). Addressing such a threat or opportunity often requires some sort of innova-
tion. Thus, there is an incentive for groups of actors to innovate in the same direction. Firms 
that are active in the same industry, for example, not only share the same environment but 
also react similarly to changes in their environment. Thus, they develop a common interest 
when being confronted with such external shocks. In this way, environmental pressure leads 
to an alignment of interests among the actors of an industry, market or an otherwise defined 
group of actors. The environmental pressure and shared interest also facilitate the formation 
of familiarity and trust among potential network partners, which, in turn, moderate opportun-
istic behaviour and facilitate collaboration (Uzzi, 1997). The more severe the possible conse-
quences of these external changes are the less need there is for an enabling actor to trigger 
network formation. Thus, in the presence of environmental pressure and the resulting align-
ment of interests networks may emerge spontaneously and in a self-organised manner. 
In cases in which the common interest or the necessity to collaborate is hard to see for the 
individual actors, an enabling actor (syn.: central planner or triggering actor) is needed to ini-
tiate network formation. This might be the case when the underlying technology is not well 
specified, the relevant knowledge is tacit or difficulties in the allocation of costs and benefits 
prevent actors from actively seeking collaboration. There are manifold reasons why the rele-
vant actors might not align to approach an external threat or opportunity. Think of public and 
private organizations pursuing different objectives (i.e. profits vs. welfare) and thus unable to 
see the possibility to combining their resources. Or, quite contrary, the relevant actors do not 
see the opportunity of collaboration because they are direct competitors in the same field or 
market. Depending on the network at hand the role of an enabling actor can be taken by an 
individual (e.g. in scientific networks), a firm (e.g. in industrial R&D networks), or a public 
actor like a government agency or department (e.g. innovation networks addressing basic re-
search and public goods or services).4 The role of the enabling actor is to contact potential 
members and inform them about the existing threat or opportunity that is best addressed by 
collaborating. Therefore, in cases where the need or advantage of collaboration cannot be seen 
by the relevant actors, an enabling actor is needed to create and design the network in a rather 
planned manner. 
Having introduced the two theoretical dimension of our network typology we now turn to the 
methodology of Social Network Analysis that allows us to distinguish not only the different 
types of networks according to the mode they are formed and the stage of the life cycle they 
are in, but also enables us to identify and distinguish the different roles of actors. The next 
section provides a short introduction to the method and some relevant indicators.5 
The Method of Social Network Analysis 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a widely used method to investigate all sorts of social net-
works. It provides insights in the roles played by different actors as well as in the structure, 
composition, and dynamic of the network itself. SNA can therefore be used to develop a ty-
pology of different network-structures and network-compositions as well as to derive some 
predictions about how well they are suited to serve a specific purpose. 
Because of this multi-dimensionality of social networks the SNA is especially eligible for the 
investigation of the generation and diffusion of new knowledge within networks. With the 
words of Müller-Prothmann (2006 p.149) 'social network analysis can serve as a proper 
                                                 
4
 While the role of the enabling actor is not formally restricted to academic and public institutions, these are 
likely to be the key ‘champions’ and key actors within such networks (Liebeskind et al., 1996; Argyres and 
Liebeskind, 1998); this is particularily likely in cases where there is no clear business opportunity for the 
underlying technology - as is the case for many public goods and services. 
5
 A short description of the relevant indicators and their interpenetration can be found in the appendix. 
method to analyze informal communication of knowledge and, thus, help to localize expertise 
and transfer of knowledge'.  
Following the common dichotomy between 'ego-networks' and 'socio-networks' we divide the 
relevant SNA measures into 'actor-related measures' and 'network-related measures'. 
Actor-Related Measures 
From what has been discussed, it became clear that not all actors play the same role in a net-
work. Some actors are very active in their collaborations and entertain many collaborative 
relationships, whereas other actors are only marginally connected. This is of major impor-
tance for the understanding of innovation networks where most often a few actors are respon-
sible for the connection of various knowledge fields and/or the respective actors, whereas 
others contribute less and exert no influence or power at all. These differences are captured by 
the actor-related measures of social network analysis as discussed in the following. 
One of the most prominent actor related measures is that of centrality. The concept of central-
ity is closely related to that of power and influence. 'An individual does not have power in the 
abstract, they have power because they dominate others – ego's power is alter's dependence.' 
(Hanneman and Riddle (2005) p. 132). There are, however, several measures of centrality, 
each of them with a different focal point. While the degree centrality accounts for the amount 
of incoming and outgoing ties an actor has to its direct neighbours, the closeness centrality 
also considers all indirect ties to all other actors in the network and therefore provides us with 
information about the position of the respective actor within the network. Betweenness cen-
trality, in turn, is a measure for the control of information flows within the network. It enables 
us to identify the importance of an actor by the extent to which it serves as an intermediary or 
liaison connecting otherwise unconnected actors or groups of actors. Thus, the Centrality-
measures are used to identify the most central and supposingly 'most important' actors of a 
network. Actors in a central position face fewer constraints and have more opportuni-
ties/choices (e.g. in receiving a certain resource) because of a better bargaining position and 
greater influence. Such central actors can both, foster or hamper the effectiveness of an inno-
vation network in that they connect different knowledge fields or exclude other network 
members from getting access to certain information. 
The most elementary measure of centrality is the degree centrality. Degree, or the degree of 
connection, thereby means the number of ties an actor has (incoming, outgoing or all). Ac-
cordingly, an unconnected actor has a degree of 0. An actor that maintains connections to 
every other member of the network has a degree of 1. The more similar the degrees of the 
different actors of a network are, the less central the individual actors are. 
The degree-based centrality of an undirected network is calculated by the sum of all ties of an 
actor ni with the other actors of the network: 
∑ ∑===
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The variable 'x' stands for the adjacency matrix while xij are the single elements of this matrix. 
The 'n' stands for the total number of actors in the network, while ni denotes one single actor. 
The inequality of ji ≠  simply means, that the relation of an actor to himself is excluded. 
To eliminate the influence of network size the degree-based centrality measure has to be nor-
malised. This is done by dividing the CD by the maximal possible centrality value (i.e. a star 
network, where one central actor maintains ties to all other actors). “This is how the Freeman 
graph centralization measures can be understood: they express the degree of inequality or variance in 
a network as a percentage of that of a perfect star network of the same size”'6 In a network consist-
ing of n actors, the maximal possible centrality value would be n-1, which is the maximal 
number of ties one actor of the network could have. The normalised degree-based centrality 
measure is denoted as C'D and calculated as follows: 
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In innovation networks, the centrality measure CD can be interpreted as the potential access to 
external knowledge sources for a single actor. The higher the centrality measure is, the easier 
it is for the corresponding actor to access knowledge provided by other actors in his network. 
One of the major advantages of the concept of degree centrality is its applicability even to 
large networks. However, it has one major shortcoming: It only accounts for the ties an actor 
has to its direct neighbours and therefore neglects the importance of the position within the 
network. An actor with a low degree centrality (few connections to other actors) could for 
example be situated in a critical point of the information flow while another actor with a high 
degree centrality has many redundant ties and is therefore of less importance to the informa-
tion flow than the first actor. This shortcoming is addressed by the measures of Closeness 
Centrality and Betweenness Centrality. 
The Closeness Centrality not only includes the direct ties of an actor but all indirect ties to all 
other actors in the network.7 Accordingly, closeness centrality does not just measure the prox-
imity of an actor to its direct neighbours, but its proximity to all other actors of the network. 
Actors that have shorter geodesic distances to other members of the network have a higher 
closeness. This increases his efficiency in receiving or distributing information and, hence, 
gives them a certain form of power – namely from acting as a 'reference point'.8 High close-
ness centrality therefore reflects the ability to access information through the communication 
flows within the network. In innovation networks the closeness centrality describes the strate-
gic position of an actor within the network. If an actor with a high closeness centrality left a 
network, this would have severe consequences for the functioning of the overall network.  
                                                 
6
 Hanneman und Riddle (2005), p. 137. 
7
 While such indirect ties are expected to be weaker and more prone to interference they are easier to maintain in terms of 
cost and time. 
8
 Hanneman und Riddle (2005) 
To measure closeness centrality the concept of the geodesics (shortest paths) is used. Analyti-
cally, closeness centrality is then calculated as the reciprocal value of the geodesic distances: 
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To make different values of closeness centrality comparable it is again necessary to normalise 
the measure by measuring the mean geodesic distance to all other reachable vertices: 
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The Betweenness Centrality, going back to Freeman (1977), is another very common central-
ity measure. Like the closeness centrality it also considers the indirect ties of actors, but is 
based on a different concept. While the closeness centrality focuses on the proximity of an 
actor to all other actors of the network, the betweenness centrality is a measure for the control 
of information flows within the network and the function of single actors as intermediaries 
(the actor between other). Betweenness therefore is the extent to which a particular actor lies 
'between' all the other actors in the network or, in other words, the percentage of times an ac-
tor lies on the shortest path 'between' two other actors. Actors that lie on many shortest paths 
between other vertices have a higher betweenness than others. An actor is the more powerful 
and influential, the more indirect ties of other actors are mediated and controlled by him/her. 
This implicates that actors with a high betweenness centrality do not necessarily have to 
maintain many direct ties themselves. It is quite possible that a good part of the information 
flows within a network passes through only a view important ties. Such actors are therefore 
referred to as intermediary, liaison or bridges. Networks that show a high level of between-
ness are more vulnerable to a disruption of information flows through strategic behaviour or 
the retreat of these key-actors. 
To calculate the betweenness centrality, it is necessary to first calculate the shortest geodesic 
paths for all pairs of actors in the network. Looking at all these possible paths, it is tested for 
every actor in how many of them he plays a mediating role. The more often an actor has a 
mediating role (i.e. lies on these paths), the higher is his betweenness centrality. 
Analytically, the betweenness centrality (CB) is the probability that the communication be-
tween any two actors k and j goes via actor i. Therefore the probability bjk for every pair j and 
k is calculated by dividing the amount of shortest paths between j and k that go via i gjk(ni) by 
the total amount of shortest paths between j and k gjk. These probabilities will then be calcu-
lated and summed up for every pair of actors in the network. 
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The betweenness centrality varies between 0 and (N-1)(N-2)/2. To normalise this value, it has 
to be divided by the maximum possible betweenness-value an actor could achieve. This 
would be the central actor in a star-network and is (n2-3n+2)/2 (which is the same than (N-
1)(N-2)/2). The normalised betweenness centrality therefore is: 
23
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The agent-based measures of SNA, as explained above, enable us to identify the different 
roles that actors may play in a social network such as innovation networks. Depending on 
their position and centrality they fulfil a certain function within the network.9 However, inno-
vations networks also differ with respect to their overall network properties. 
Network-Related Measures 
While the arguments above belong to the ego-centric perspective in SNA, the following para-
graph deals with the ‘network perspective’. This top-down proceeding allows for the assess-
ment of the overall characteristics of a network as well as for the identification of its strong 
and weak parts. From this, implications can be derived concerning the need for changes in the 
network structure or the absence of an important function (e.g. that of a broker or bridge). 
Furthermore the number, size and connectivity of sub-structures (such as cliques and clusters) 
allows for the identification of the opportunities and constrains that single actors and groups 
of actors face, as well as for the prediction of the evolution of the network. 
The Network Density describes the general level of linkage among the actors in a network. It 
is the number of actors who are connected to each other, expressed as a percentage of the 
maximum possible number of connected actors. The network density therefore is the propor-
tion of ties in a network relative to the total number possible (i.e. if all actors of a network are 
directly connected with each other the density is 100%). It is a valuable measure which de-
scribes the overall coherence of a network and therefore allows for implications concerning 
the speed of diffusion of information and knowledge within the network and the levels of so-
cial capital and/or social constraints that actors face (Hannemann und Riddle, 2005). The 
density is calculated as follows:  
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While n·(n-1) is the total number of possible ties, k stands for the relation under consideration. 
The concept is best suited for analysing and comparing data on multiple networks (e.g. net-
works in different sectors or countries). 
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 Examples for such roles would be coordinators (actors who broker connections within the same group), gate-
keepers (actors who broker connections between their own group and another), liaisons or boundary 
spanners (actors who broker connections between 2 different groups), peripheral specialists who are only 
connected to one other member. 
A common approach to assess the embeddedness of the network is to measure the mean geo-
desic distance. The geodesic distance between two actors is simply the shortest walk connect-
ing them (i.e. the smallest number of edges connecting them). This geodesic path is often also 
attributed to be the optimal or most efficient connection between two actors. The average 
geodesic distance for one actor to all others, the variation in these distances, and the number 
of geodesic paths to other actors may all describe important similarities and differences be-
tween the actors in how closely they are connected to their entire population. Other than con-
nectivity it is not about the possibility of reaching another actor, but about the length of this 
connection. To apply geodesic distance to entire networks we calculate the mean geodesic 
distances for the network and every actor therein. A small mean geodesic distance indicates 
that information is likely to reach everyone, and to do so fairly quickly. From the average 
geodesic distances conclusions can be drawn concerning the speed of diffusion, the cost of 
exchanges (the longer the geodesic distance the more expensive the exchange is), the vulner-
ability and stability of the network and the power and influence as well as constraints and 
opportunities of single actors.  
Yet another network-measure is the degree distribution. It provides some important informa-
tion about the homogeneity or heterogeneity of the actors. A substantial amount of concentra-
tion within a network means that the power of individual actors varies substantially which in 
turn indicates that positional advantages are rather unequally distributed in this network. As 
we have seen above, the degree of an actor in a network is the number of connections it has to 
other actors. Then, the degree distribution is simply the probability distribution of these de-
grees over the entire network. Thus, the degree distribution measures how concentrated 
around some central actors the network is. A high degree distribution describes a network in 
which there are no dominant central actors but many well-connected actors, while a low de-
gree distribution indicates the existence of one or some more central actors. A network char-
acterised by a high degree distribution provides the prerequisites for a quicker and more cer-
tain information-flow. A network characterised by a low degree distribution is dominated by 
some central actors that control information flows and hold the network together. 
A Taxonomy of Innovation Networks 
Employing the introduced concepts of the industry life cycle and the network formation we 
are now able to distinguish six different types of networks according to the stage of their life 
cycle they are in (formation, growth, and maturity) and the kind of their formation (planned or 
spontaneous). Networks that are at the same stage of their life cycle are distinguished using 
the two indicators from Social Network Analysis that showed the most significant difference 
between our theory-based spontaneous and planned networks. 
Table 1: The six types of innovation networks. 
(1) Formation (2) Growth (3) Maturity
Spontaneous S1 S2 S3
Planned P1 P2 P3
 
In the following we apply this network typology to identify the distinctive characteristics of 
the different types of innovation networks based on the discussed indicators and measures 
from Social Network Analysis. This is done by a comparison of the spontaneous and planned 
network for the three stages of the innovation network life cycle. To further enhance the un-
derstanding we illustrate the different types of networks and provide the respective SNA indi-
cators in brackets. However, these ‘stylized networks’ are deducted from our theoretical con-
siderations and only serve as an illustrative example to facilitate the understanding and dis-
tinction of the different network types. 
The Formation Phase - Spontaneous Emergence vs. Planned Creation 
At this early stage of network formation the central processes are the composition and struc-
turing of the network. The (formal) structure of a network determines the communication as 
well as the establishment of shared norms, a common language and mutual understanding. 
These factors facilitate trust and joint learning. 
Since the spontaneous network emerges due to some sort of external pressure and the result-
ing shared interest among a specified group of actors (e.g. from the same industry or region) 
there is a high likelihood that many of the participating actors already know each other. This 
might be due to previous market transactions, earlier collaboration or informal relations. The 
environmental pressure and common interest not only facilitate the achievement of an opera-
tional consensus regarding the composition, structure and expected lifespan of the innovation 
network which leads to more optimistic expectations about the ability and stability of the net-
work, but also facilitates mutual learning (Doz et al., 2000). Thus, if not too many resources 
are dedicated to finding consensus, spontaneous networks are better suited for exploitative 
research since its members come from related fields and have rather specialized knowledge 
and capabilities in a certain field of technology. The resulting network structure is shown in  
Other in the planned network, here, an enabling actor takes the initiative and forms the net-
work according to his own perceptions. He identifies and invites the other members of the 
network. By intentionally addressing them and providing the incentives to form a collabora-
tive network, the enabling actor largely determines the composition and structure of the 
planned network. For this kind of network formation it is not necessary that the members 
know each other; it is sufficient that the enabling actor knows them. Accordingly, the inner 
core of a planned network is most likely based on the central actor’s personal network or on 
his pre-existing informal relations (see e.g. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven, 1996; Pyka, 1997). 
Depending on the purpose of the network they might come from different fields and sectors 
and include public as well as private actors. While this heterogeneity of actors implies differ-
ent aims, cognitive structures and languages which impose an obstacle to efficient knowledge 
sharing and technology transfer it also increases the potential of cross-fertilization and recom-
binant innovation (Nelson and Winter 1982; Fleming 2001; Fleming and Sorenson 2001).  
This makes planned networks better suited for explorative search (March 1991). However, the 
costs of consensus finding might be relatively high. Other than in the spontaneous network, 
where consensus is a matter of shared interest, it is the enabling actor who needs to seek this 
consensus among the members of the network. The resulting network structures are shown in 
figures 5 and 6. 
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Figure 4: Stylized S1 Network. 
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Figure 5: Stylized P1-Network. 
Looking at the network indicators it appears that the degree centrality and degree distribu-
tion (i.e. the number of ties that actors maintain) as a measure of the network centrality is 
rather high in the planned network as compared to the spontaneous network (96,36% com-
pared to 20%). The enabling actor possesses a normalized degree of 100% (i.e. he is directly 
connected to all other members of the network), while most actors are peripheral and only 
connected to him. This leads to a highly unequal degree distribution and a network centraliza-
tion that leaves all the power, influence and coordination with the enabling actor. In the spon-
taneous network, in turn, most actors maintain a similar number of relationships, which im-
plies that there is no enabling actor dominating the network, nor are there many peripheral 
actors that are barely connected. Rather, power and influence are more evenly distributed 
among the network members.  
These differences in actor centrality have also major implications for other network character-
istics like, for example, the network density (i.e. the number of actors who are connected to 
each other, expressed as a percentage of the maximum possible number of connected actors). 
In the spontaneous network the density is relatively high at this initial stage of the network 
life cycle (0,2879). Therefore, the respective core network is very stable and information and 
knowledge diffuses quickly throughout the whole network. Furthermore, the network contains 
a large amount of social capital and its actors are less constrained in the channels through 
which they exchange knowledge and information. In the planned network, in contrast, the 
density is relatively low (0,1979), making the stability of the network as well as the knowl-
edge flows highly dependent on the enabling actor. 
The Growth Phase - Growth by Attraction vs. Growth by Invitation 
As indicated above, the two types of networks also differ in the way they grow. While addi-
tional members of a spontaneous network are attracted by the expected benefits of joining the 
network or are recommended by existing members, the planned network grows the way it was 
formed: by the initiative of the enabling actor. Thus, in a spontaneous network additional 
members are recruited via a process of attraction and internal recommendation. This leads to a 
growth process that resembles a snowball-effect: existing members suggest or introduce the 
new members. The resulting network is strong in itself without having a strong and powerful 
central actor. In the planned network the central actor identifies and invites additional mem-
bers to the network. This leads to a network in which the central planner is strong, while the 
network itself is weak (i.e. fragile). The resulting network structure resembles more a hub and 
spoke network than the snowball pattern of the spontaneous network. The respective network 
structures are shown in figures 6 and 7. 
Because of these different growth processes of spontaneous and planned networks the differ-
ence in their centrality persists. Looking at the closeness centrality (i.e. the average distance 
between all actors of the network) we observe that the spontaneous network still shows a rela-
tively low centralization (30,06%) compared to the planned network (98,95%). Thus, because 
the central actor in a planned network serves as a connector (syn.: boundary spanner or bro-
ker) all actors are in relatively close proximity to each other. While this once again confirms 
the central position of the enabling actor, it also indicates a quicker and potentially more effi-
cient knowledge flow within the planned network.  
Accordingly, the average geodesic distance between all pairs of actors is relatively shorter in 
the planned network (1,905). There, no actor is more than two ‘steps’ away from any other 
actor of the network, because they are connected via the central actor. This is different in the 
spontaneous network, where some actors have their information to be passed on by several 
other actors in order to reach their recipient (2,963). This is caused by the snow-ball like 
growth process during which many members are recommended or attracted by just one actor 
who himself might not be very well connected. 
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Figure 6: Stylized S2 Network. 
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Figure 7: Stylized P2 Network. 
The Maturity Phase - Egalitarian Maturity vs. Hierarchical Maturity 
The maturity stage of the network life cycle is by no means less dynamic then the first two 
stages. The repeated and intensifying interaction between the different actors as well as the 
ongoing fluctuation in the composition of the network also cause significant changes in its 
structure. Although these dynamics are more prominent in the spontaneous network they are, 
on a lower scale, also taking place in a planned network. Figures 8 and 9 show the structure of 
the spontaneous and planned networks at this stage of their life cycle. 
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Figure 8: Stylized S3 Network. 
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Figure 9: Figure P3 Network. 
As in the earlier stages the centrality the betweenness centrality (i.e. the percentage of times 
an actor lies on the shortest path 'between' two other actors) is significantly higher in the 
planned network compared to the spontaneous network (94,45% compared to 29,77%). This 
is because the enabling actor is connecting all other actors and thus lies on many of the short-
est paths between any pair of actors in the network. In the spontaneous network the picture 
looks different. Here, the majority of the actors lie on the shortest path between a pair of other 
actors. In the spontaneous network the picture looks different. Thus, the betweenness central-
ity is more evenly distributed then in the planned network. Because most actors in a sponta-
neous network are connected to many others, every actor also lies on several shortest paths 
between two other actors. Therefore we observe the same pattern as in the first two stages, 
with the planned network showing a very high centralization and the spontaneous network 
showing a rather low one. Once again this illustrates the outstanding role that the enabling 
actor plays as a boundary spanner in the planned network. He connects otherwise uncon-
nected actors and controls a large part of the information flow between them. This provides 
him with enormous power and influence within the network and at the same time makes him 
‘the weakest point’ (syn.: cut point) when it comes to network stability. With him retreating 
the network would dissolve.  
These insights are confirmed by the degree distribution which is significantly higher in the 
planned network (95,67 as opposed to 18,33). This indicates that in the planned network most 
actors are so called ‘peripheral actors’ or ‘peripheral specialists’ (they maintain no direct con-
nections except those to the central actor). In the spontaneous network, in turn, we observe 
more equally distributed degrees (most actors maintain a similar amount of ties) which is 
positively related to the speed, quality and certainty of knowledge exchange, as well as the 
overall stability and density of the whole network. 
Table 2 summarizes the predicted differences in the respective SNA characteristics of sponta-
neous and planned networks in the different phases of their life cycle. 
Table 2: Characteristics of the six types of innovation networks. 
SNA Indicators S1 P1 S2 P2 S3 P3
Actor Based
Meeasures
Degree
Centrality
low high
Closeness
Centrality
low high
Betweenness
Centrality
low high
Network Based
Measures
Density high low
Mean Geodesic
Distance
high low
Degree
Distribution
low high
 
This taxonomy is based on a highly stylized concept of network evolution. Two scenarios that 
are likely to be observed in real world innovation networks are the growth by preferential at-
tachment of spontaneous networks and the retreat of the central actor at a certain point in the 
life cycle of planned networks. Both, the process of preferential attachment as well as the crit-
ical event of the central actor retrieving from the network have a major impact on the network 
structure and performance. We will discuss these concepts and their implications in the fol-
lowing section. 
 
Alternative Dynamics – Growth by Preferential Attachment and the Delegating Retreat 
of the Enabling Actor 
Empirical evidence suggests that networks often grow by preferential attachment (Albert 
and Barabasi, 2002).10 Other than in the growth by recommendation as underlying our typol-
ogy, this process is based on the idea that potential new actors try to connect to the most cen-
tral (powerful, influential) actors. Following the logic of this algorithm, new actors prefer to 
attach themselves to existing actors according to the latter’s degree. The benefit of linking to 
an actor with a high degree is that this provides the new actor with short pathways and a high 
connectivity within the network. Preferential attachment is a likely scenario for spontaneous 
innovation networks. Linking themselves to a central actor provides the new actors with 
better access to the knowledge that flows within the network. Yet another argument for pref-
erential attachment is reputation. As degree centrality is also a measure of prestige and influ-
ence, the new actors benefit from being linked to a central actor because this enhances their 
own prestige and reputation which, in turn, increases their prospects of collaborating with 
other attractive partners. 
The growth by preferential attachment has severe consequences for the resulting network 
structure. If the probability of a new actor to connect with an already existing actor depends 
on the latter’s degree, the networks produced by this algorithm show a skewed, scale-free 
degree distribution. Those actors who were relatively central (i.e. had above average degrees) 
in the first stage of the network life cycle grow even more central during the following stages. 
Thus, the process of preferential attachment underlines and even enhances the power and in-
fluence of central actors within a network. The resulting network structure resembles more a 
hub and spoke network than the snowball pattern we described above. Thus, the growth by 
preferential attachment of the spontaneous network resembles the growth pattern of a planned 
network, where every actor attaches himself to the enabling actor (the actor with the highest 
degree centrality), except that there is not just one central actors but several. 
A very likely scenario in the evolution of planned innovation networks is the retreat of the 
enabling actor (central actor) at a certain point in network evolution. This would redistribute 
the network positions of many actors and provide the opportunity to significantly change the 
overall network structure. Two theoretical considerations reinforce the likelihood of this 
event. First, every actor, including the enabling actor, has only limited resources and capacity 
at his disposal (e.g. time, financial resources, information processing capacity etc.). Therefore 
he cannot play the central role indefinitely but needs to delegate at least part of his responsi-
bilities to other members or retreat from the network once his resources are exhausted. A sec-
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 Powell et al. (2005) find evidence for scale-free degree distributions in the collaborations between biotechnol-
ogy firms. This tendency of firms to connect to highly connected firms is also tested empirically by Powell 
et al. (2006) but has lead to ambiguous results. In reality most networks exhibit power law distributions 
with exponents smaller than three in their degrees. One explanation why the actual observed distribution is 
less skewed than one would predict from preferential attachment is that ‘proximity matters’. Following this 
reasoning new actors – even though attracted by the ones with highest connectivity – often connect to actors 
with lower degree if these are more proximate in any of the five distinguished dimensions of proximity (i.e. 
cognitive, organizational, social, institutional, and geographical proximity). 
ond rational is that the enabling actors’ only intention might be to initiate the network forma-
tion and ensure its efficiency by composing and structuring it according to his perception be-
fore retreating from his central position. This second scenario describes what is usually as-
sumed concerning the intention of a public actor promoting basic research in a certain field or 
fostering innovative collaboration on a regional level. This is confirmed Doz et al. (2000) who 
find that public actors are often only interested in providing the necessary environment before 
moving on to other projects. 
Looking at the indicators from Social Network Analysis that we used to distinguish planned 
and spontaneous networks it becomes clear that the retreat of the central actor would have 
severe consequences for the structure and functioning of the network. The high values of cen-
trality observed in the planned network at all stage of its life cycle illustrate the outstanding 
role that the enabling actor plays as an information broker, intermediary or boundary spanner. 
He connects otherwise unconnected actors and controls a large part of the information flow 
between them. As we have established before, he is extremely well informed about what is 
going on in the network which gives him enormous power and influence within the network 
but at the same time makes him ‘the weakest point’ (‘cut point’) when it comes to network 
stability. With him retreating in an unplanned manner, the network would simply dissolve. 
Thus, his retreat needs to be carefully prepared. There are at least three possible scenarios or 
‘exiting strategies’ for the central actor: a) he could install one successor who takes over his 
position and responsibilities; b) he could install a number of central actors who, together, ful-
fil his role; or c) he could establish the necessary amount of direct ties between all actors of 
the network, so the network is stable and functional without any central actor. Considering 
these alternatives it becomes clear that option a) would not solve the problem of limited re-
sources and capacity and, thus, is rather unlikely. Also it would have no significant influence 
on the network structure. Option c) in turn would lead to a network structure that is similar to 
the one we assumed for the spontaneous network at the maturity stage. However, intentionally 
establishing the necessary connectivity amongst the heterogeneous actors of a planned net-
work seems an unrealistic endeavour. Thus, the most promising and also most likely alterna-
tive is option b). By delegating the responsibility for different tasks or technological fields to 
different actors, the retreating central actor ensures that their capacity is not exceeded and, at 
the same time, renders the possibility for labour division and specialization. All actors serving 
a certain function, working on the same problem or belonging to a certain technological field 
will be linked to one rather central actor. This allows for a closer and more intense interaction 
within these groups of rather homogeneous actors and thereby leads to the establishment of 
further direct links between these actors. The resulting network structure is characterized by a 
group of central actors (i.e. the central core) that are densely connected among themselves and 
to the members of their respective specialized groups. This basically resembles the network 
structure of spontaneous networks growing by preferential attachment. Thus, the two alterna-
tive developments we described here both lead to a network structure that combines the ad-
vantages of short average path length with a high degree of clustering (see figures 10 and 11). 
This network structure is referred to as a ‘small world’ and is considered to be especially 
advantageous for the creation and diffusion of new knowledge – i.e. for innovation networks. 
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Figure 10: Stylized S3 Network resulting from Growth by Preferential Attachment in S2. 
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Figure 11: Stylized P3 Network after the Retreat of the Central Actor. 
Following the arguments presented in this paragraph we expect that over time the distinction 
of the two types of networks becomes somewhat blurred. As networks evolve they change 
with respect to many, if not most, of their characteristics (see e.g. Madhavan et al., 1998). The 
network composition might change with the entrance of new actors and the exiting of others. 
New relations might be established while others get dissolved. The content and extent of es-
tablished relations might also change as well as the initial purpose or objective of the network. 
Thus the boundary between the two types of networks becomes permeable. What started as a 
planned network of largely unrelated actors might become more and more like a spontaneous 
network as new relations are formed, trust is built and the formal structures are underpinned 
by informal relations (Pyka, 1997; Lorenzoni and Lipparini, 1999). After interacting repeat-
edly on a formal basis, informal ties are created that even outlast the formal collaboration. 
Following Hakanson (1989), we therefore postulate that with an increasing duration of formal 
cooperation, formal network structures mutate to informal relationships as mutual trust and 
confidence between the partners is built. Spontaneous networks in turn might be threatened by 
some sort of lock-in: Constrained by a strong common interest and similar capabilities and 
knowledge bases spontaneous networks become inflexible and unable to recognize alternative 
approaches in responding to changes in their environment (Uzzi, 1997). Thus, they might 
have to change their focus from exploiting their existing knowledge base to the exploration of 
new alternatives. As argued above, this is better achieved in a network that shows the charac-
teristics of a planned network (i.e. strong central actor, formalization, heterogeneous actors 
etc.). Thus, if the network is a success or shows potential for further collaboration a central 
actor might take the initiative and create a new network on basis of the existing relations. 
From this we conclude that long-term network survival depends on the ability to combine the 
advantages of the two types of networks. We have argued that while the mode of network 
formation might have an enduring impact it does not necessarily determine the network struc-
ture at later stages of the network life cycles. Depending on the growth-process of spontane-
ous networks and the network-shaping activities of the enabling (central) actor in the planned 
network, we can also expect some convergence towards the favourable small world network 
structure. This indicates a process of convergence between the two network types. The con-
vergence of the two forms of networks can be so complete, that it is no longer possible to dis-
tinguish the two types of networks using the indicators from SNA. 
Concluding Remarks 
Drawing from theory and existing empirical evidence we proposed that knowledge-based 
networks emerge either spontaneously due to environmental pressure and a resulting shared 
interest or by a ‘planned’ process involving an enabling actor initiating its formation and con-
trolling its growth. Which way a network forms itself depends on the prevalent conditions. 
The initiation stage with the process of network formation is probably the most important 
stage in the life cycle of an innovation network since it sets the stage for its further evolution. 
Employing indicators from Social Network Analysis we are able to distinguish these persis-
tent differences between spontaneous and planned innovation networks along their life cycle.  
However, theory and empirical evidence also indicate that the mode of network formation 
does not determine all future developments and outcomes of the respective networks. We find 
plausible arguments for alternative development paths that lead to a rather similar network 
structure. In the case of the spontaneous network we suggest the concept of preferential at-
tachment as an alternative growth pattern which has major implications concerning the result-
ing network structure at the maturity stage. A spontaneous network growing by preferential 
attachment leads to a network that is characterized by a short average path length and a rela-
tively high clustering coefficient. These characteristics describe what has been labelled a 
‘small world network’ and are associated to quick knowledge diffusion and the possibility to 
exchange even complex knowledge. Because of these characteristics, the small world network 
is widely acknowledged as a highly efficient network structure, especially in the context of 
knowledge exchange and innovation.  
We observe a very similar network structure for planned networks in which the enabling actor 
retreats from its central position by delegating his functions to a group of actors. This bears 
some important implications for the changing role of actors as well as for the management of 
public private innovation networks in services (ServPPINs). Focusing on public private inno-
vation networks we argue that the retreat of the central actor (e.g. a public body) at the mature 
stage of a planned ServPPIN is not only a very likely and empirically confirmed scenario but 
also constitutes a critical event that has severe consequences for the functioning and stability 
of the network. Since the central actor of a planned ServPPIN serves as the connector (also 
boundary spanner or information broker) he is essential for the knowledge flow as well as the 
overall stability of the network. Thus, if he retreats without ensuring the viability and stability 
of the network, the ServPPIN would dissolves. Due to the limited capacities and resources 
that the individual actors have at their disposal and because of the possibility to render effi-
ciency-gains through labour division and specialization associated we suggest what we call a 
‘delegating retreat’. This scenario envisages the division and delegation of the retreating (pub-
lic) actor’s functions and power on the shoulders of several public and private actors. These 
actors should be members of the network for quite some time, maintain direct ties to their 
relevant peers within the network, and must have proven to be capable of handling this re-
sponsibility. However, the resulting flattening of the hierarchy not only imposes more respon-
sibility on the newly assigned central actors but on all members of the network. Even the for-
merly peripheral actors are now obliged to establish new relationships and to interact more 
intensely not only with the new central actors but also with the other members of their respec-
tive sub-group. While this constitutes a major challenge for the individual communication 
capabilities of the actors, it allows for a more intensive exploitation and exploration of new 
solutions at the cluster and network level respectively. 
Another important aspect in this development is timing. The disruptions and implications as-
sociated with the retreat of the central enabling actor also depend on the current stage of the 
network’s life cycle. To minimize the negative effects and to smoothen the process of restruc-
turing the retreat should take place at a stage at which the network itself is stable i.e. a mature 
stage. At this stage, the network is characterized by a high network density and connectivity 
which ensure its capability to absorb the shocks resulting from the retreat of its central actor.  
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